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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3598 
___________ 
 
LINDSWORTH BROWN-SESSAY, Petitioner 
 
VS. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A076-576-183) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Leo A. Finston 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 22, 2013 
 
Before: SCIRICA, JORDAN and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  May 28, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Lindsworth Brown-Sessay (“Sessay”)1 petitions for review of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) August 24, 2012 decision upholding the Immigration 
                                              
1
 Brown-Sessay’s filings refer to himself as “Sessay,” and we will do the same here. 
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Judge’s (“IJ”) decision ordering Sessay’s removal to Jamaica.  While this case was at the 
briefing stage, Sessay moved the BIA to reopen his removal proceedings.  The BIA 
subsequently granted that motion and remanded the administrative record to the IJ for 
further proceedings. 
 In light of the BIA’s grant of reopening, both parties now argue that Sessay’s 
petition for review should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  We agree.  Our 
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) is limited to the review of “final order[s] of 
removal.”  Although the BIA’s August 24, 2012 decision constituted a final order of 
removal at the time Sessay filed his petition, the BIA’s subsequent grant of reopening 
effectively vacated that decision.  See Bronisz v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 
2004); Lopez-Ruiz v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 886, 887 (9th Cir. 2002) (order).  Because there 
is no longer a final order of removal before us, we will dismiss Sessay’s petition for lack 
of jurisdiction.
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2
 Sessay’s brief, filed before the BIA’s grant of reopening, included requests for 
miscellaneous relief.  To the extent Sessay continues to seek that relief, those requests are 
hereby denied. 
